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The sources of knowledge not valued in the discipline of epistemology are belief. This reflects that knowledge is more significant than just a true belief. A belief according to philosophers cannot be proved so it is of no significance in epistemology (Riggs, 2002). It is also important to identify if the belief can provide value for the knowledge. It reflects the need for considering the value of reliability. Another claim states that it is not possible to support belief with facts that make it an unreliable source (Plato, 2017).

The discipline of epistemology stresses on the sufficient conditions of knowledge and its sources. Sources that lacks justification cannot be considered as a reliable source of knowledge. A belief that lacks adequate evidence or fails to justify claims is an invalid and unreliable source of knowledge. A belief cannot be considered as a source of knowledge because it is based on one’s mental assumptions (Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008). Similarly, the justification that is limited to one's mind also undermines the value of the source. True beliefs require evidence that is difficult to provide. This makes belief as an unvalued source of knowledge in epistemology. The discipline of epistemology emphasizes on factual information that means logic (Feldman, 2000).

However, belief lacks factual information because of it the product of one's thinking. People lack a high degree of control over beliefs that also make them invaluable. The concept of rational logic is also required for proving the value of knowledge. The beliefs are not supported with rational logic in most of the cases that make it an invaluable source of knowledge. False beliefs rely on irrational reasons and cannot be constituted as a source of knowledge. Similarly, it is also supported by weak claims that don't fulfil the conditions of valuable knowledge.

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