Moral Domain

Differences Between Justice, Care, And Virtue

Justice, as an idea, covers several features of human life. This is a ethical group, a category of politics and law. Like good and evil, justice appeared in the early stages of the birth of human society. Justice, as a public concept, provides for a certain freedom for any person, including the right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech and association, freedom to achieve public success, despite the difference in starting opportunities. Aristotle, who first outlined what justice is, singled out 2 of his views. Aristotelian types of justice remain unchanged to this day. The first type is equalization justice in society. It operates in the sphere of material goods produced by people and implies equal remuneration for equally invested labor, compliance with the price and value of a thing, compensation in the equivalent in which it was caused (Slote, 2010).

The selection of care as an independent moral phenomenon occurred in ethical thought rather late. If the antithesis "love and justice" permeates Western European ethics from the time of the clash and union of ancient and Judeo-Christian moral traditions, then the antithesis "justice and care" became the focus of moral philosophy only in the second half of the 20th century. and in connection with attempts to comprehend the results of psychological studies concerning the age dynamics of moral consciousness (Baier, 1987).

The theoretical understanding of morality through the prism of the concept of "virtue" and the organization of moral life around this concept give rise to a number of serious problems. Among them, above all, the problem of universality. Appealing to the nature of a being that is infinitely plastic means being under the power of a destructive illusion. The ethics of virtue can defend against this accusation either by accepting the historicity of human nature.

Moral judgments usually take the form of justification. We should honor our father and mother, be committed to the interests of our country, tell the truth, not kill, etc. In what sense can such moral judgments contain logical judgments that can be true or false, so that logical logic can be applied to them principles? The difference between what is and what should be. Without a doubt, these maxims are part of our social heritage, and this is a historical fact. They serve as prescriptions for behavior, occur from time immemorial, rooted in tradition and preached by religious preachers and wise men (Slote, 2007).

Most of these maxims express what we seek to put into practice, and, in general, they are used. People honor their parents, speak the truth, refrain from murder, not by virtue of coercion, but by their own preference, which seems natural. However, natural propensity alone, even if it is supported by public pressure and imposed sanctions, is not enough to eliminate all discrepancies between moral maxims and actual behavior. If in any community, no matter how big, no one has violated these rules for a long period of time, and at the same time there is no corresponding general teaching in it that is considered necessary for all, then we can begin to consider these maxims as representing natural laws, i.e., as constant relations or uniformity in actual behavior. However, it will still be logically possible to ask why one should respect other people's property, honor parents, etc (Steiner, & Okrusch, 2006). The very form of these questions demonstrates the difference between maxims, which are often called “moral laws”, and laws of natural science.

To conclude, the distinction between justification and judgement can be viewed from a position of coherence, and not from a position of absolute nature. The various practical goals we pursue and the practical rules corresponding to them sometimes do not agree with each other, and in order to obtain a consistent and consistent set of judgments, for example, about the right way of life, one should look for such general axioms or postulates that would allow to make correct judgments regarding all life situations.

References

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